Publicación:
El rol de las Cortes y la protección de la democracia: una aproximación desde regímenes transicionales

dc.contributor.authorBenítez R., Vicente F.spa
dc.contributor.authorGonzález H., Germán A.spa
dc.date.accessioned2016-06-15 00:00:00
dc.date.accessioned2022-09-09T20:59:52Z
dc.date.available2016-06-15 00:00:00
dc.date.available2022-09-09T20:59:52Z
dc.date.issued2016-06-15
dc.description.abstractEste artículo explora los factores institucionales y políticos que permiten o impiden la consolidación de un Tribunal Constitucional en democracias en transición como la colombiana y la venezolana. Estas democracias, a su turno, son susceptibles de ser víctimas de intentos de constitucionalismo abusivo por parte de ejecutivos poderosos, fenómeno típico de democracias jóvenes. Este escrito analiza casos constitucionales exitosos y fracasados de Europa Central, Asia y Latinoamérica para efectos de identificar cuáles factores propician o frenan la posibilidad de un control de constitucionalidad efectivo en nuevas democracias. El artículo concluye que aspectos tales como la independencia judicial, la separación de los poderes, el prestigio de las Cortes y la deferencia judicial hacia otras ramas son cruciales para identificar si un Tribunal será exitoso.spa
dc.description.abstractThis article explores the political factors that enable or prevent the consolidation of an effective judicial review in transitional democracies such as the Colombian and the Venezuelan ones. These democracies, in turn, are likely to be victims of abusive constitutionalism attempts by powerful executives, which is a phenomenon typical of young democracies. This paper analyzes key cases of successful and unsuccessful experiences in Central Europe, Asia and Latin America in order to identify what kind of factors allow or hinder a Tribunal’s effective judicial review in new democracies. I argue that factors as judicial independence, separation of powers, Courts’ reputation, and judicial deference to other branches, are key elements to determine whether a Tribunal will be a successful institution. eng
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dc.identifier.doi10.18601/01229893.n36.02
dc.identifier.eissn2346-2051
dc.identifier.issn0122-9893
dc.identifier.urihttps://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/handle/001/10477
dc.identifier.urlhttps://doi.org/10.18601/01229893.n36.02
dc.language.isospaspa
dc.publisherDepartamento de Derecho Constitucionalspa
dc.relation.bitstreamhttps://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/article/download/4573/5261
dc.relation.bitstreamhttps://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/article/download/4573/5368
dc.relation.citationeditionNúm. 36 , Año 2016 : Enero-Juniospa
dc.relation.citationendpage67
dc.relation.citationissue36spa
dc.relation.citationstartpage41
dc.relation.ispartofjournalRevista Derecho del Estadospa
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dc.sourcehttps://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/article/view/4573spa
dc.subjectControl jurisdiccionalspa
dc.subjectdemocraciaspa
dc.subjectrevisión de la Constituciónspa
dc.subjectColombiaspa
dc.subjectVenezuelaspa
dc.subjectHungríaspa
dc.subjectIndiaspa
dc.subjectderecho comparadospa
dc.subjectCorte Constitucionalspa
dc.subjectJudicial revieweng
dc.subjectdemocracyeng
dc.subjectconstitutional revisioneng
dc.subjectColombiaeng
dc.subjectVenezuelaeng
dc.subjectHungaryeng
dc.subjectIndiaeng
dc.subjectComparative Laweng
dc.subjectConstitutional Court.eng
dc.titleEl rol de las Cortes y la protección de la democracia: una aproximación desde regímenes transicionalesspa
dc.title.translatedThe role of the Courts sustaining democracy: An approach from transitional regimeseng
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